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Abstract. Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truth-
fully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, when agents
have multiple opportunities for revealing information, and take into account long-term effects of their
actions, deception and reticence may appear. Such situations have been described in the literature. No
simple rules exist to distinguish between the truthful and the untruthful situations, and a determination
has been done in isolated cases only.
This is of relevance to prediction markets, where the market value is a common prediction, and more
generally in informal public prediction forums, such as stock-market estimates by analysts. We describe
three different mechanisms that are strategy-proof with non-myopic considerations, and show that one
of them, a discounted market scoring rule, meets all our requirements from a mechanism in almost all
prediction settings. To illustrate, we extensively analyze a prediction setting with continuous outcomes,
and show how our suggested mechanism restores prompt truthfulness where incumbent mechanisms
fail.
1 Introduction
Mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their information truthfully and promptly are desir-
able in many situations.
Consider, for example, the estimation of company earnings by stock-market analysts, a long-
standing Wall Street institution. Publicly-traded companies announce their earnings for the latest
quarter or year, on dates set well in advance. Each company is typically covered by several stock-
market analysts, the larger ones by dozens. These analysts issue reports containing predictions of
a company’s future earnings. The timing of such predictions may range from several years to days
before earnings announcement, and every analyst typically updates his prediction several times in
the interval. These predictions eventually become publicly available, and a consensus calculated
from all predictions in force may be viewed on several popular finance websites. Not least, the
analysts themselves are aware of, and are no doubt influenced by the actions and opinions of their
peers.
In essence, this earnings estimation functions as a public prediction forum with an evolving
consensus, that terminates when a company announces its true earnings for the forecast period,
which we call the outcome. It acts as a sort of advisory forum for the public of investors, and this
public’s interest is best served if analysts share their information and judgement truthfully and
promptly.
Prediction markets are public prediction forums organized as markets. A de-facto standard for
organizing prediction markets is due to Hanson (2003), using a market scoring rule. In such a
market, probability estimates are rewarded by a proper scoring rule an amount S(p, r), where p is
a probability distribution of the outcome, and r is the outcome. A trader in Hanson’s markets not
only makes her probability estimate public, she changes the market price to it. She then stands
to be rewarded by the market maker for her prediction (when the outcome becomes known), but
she also commits to compensate the previous trader for his prediction. Her total compensation is
therefore the difference S(p, r) − S(p′, r) where p′ is the replaced market prediction. When the
logarithmic scoring rule (S(p, r) = log pr)
1 is used in a prediction market, the mechanism is called
LMSR (Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule). Hanson also demonstrated how a market maker can
facilitate such an LMSR market and provide liquidity by selling and buying shares of each outcome.
Proper scoring rules, are, by their definition, incentive compatible for myopic agents2. That is,
an agent maximizes her expected score by announcing her true belief, provided longer-term effects
of the prediction, if any, are ignored. The incremental, market variation of the scoring rule does
not affect this incentive compatibility, because the previous agent’s score does not depend on the
current prediction. Furthermore, it is a straightforward generalization of Hanson (2003) to apply
market scoring rules to multiple-choice, or continuous outcomes (such as in our earnings estimate
forum).
When an agent is not myopic, and does take into account all consequences of her action, truth-
fulness will, in many cases, not be her optimal strategy, and incentive compatibility is lost. Such
scenarios have been described in the literature, and our paper adds many further examples. As we
will show, the damage to incentive compatibility caused by long-term strategic considerations is
extensive, and it is a priori unclear whether any remedy is available.
Our aim is the design of mechanisms for rewarding predictions that are strategy-proof. We
demonstrate the problem with proper scoring rules, as often leading to reticence or deception. We
formulate criteria for determining which prediction settings are truthful, and apply these criteria for
a complete classification of the important class of prediction settings with normal and lognormal
signals. We suggest three strategy-proof mechanisms, and identify one of them, discounting, as
having all desirable properties. We prove the applicability and effectiveness of the discounting
mechanism.
1.1 The Problem with Scoring Rules
A scoring rule S : ∆(R) × R 7→ R scores a prediction p, representing a probability distribution
of the outcome, a value S(p, r) when the outcome is r. An agent whose belief of the outcome
distribution is q has score expectation S(p, q) := Er∼q S(p, r) for prediction p. A proper scoring
rule is one for which S(q, q) ≥ S(p, q) for every p, q ∈ ∆(R), so that predicting one’s true belief has
maximal score expectation. A strictly proper scoring rule is one where the inequality is tight only
for p = q. The logarithmic scoring rule S(p, r) = log pr, and the quadratic (a.k.a. Brier) scoring
rule S(p, r) = 2pr − p · p − 1 are examples of strictly proper scoring rules. More background on
scoring rules may be found, e.g., in Gneiting and Raftery (2007).
The following generic example illustrates the problem when non-myopic considerations apply.
Example 1. The public wants to predict a variable, whose outcome is x. Every signal of x is, i.i.d.,
x+ ǫ with probability 1/2, and x− ǫ with probability 1/2. ǫ is unknown. There is an expert, who
gets private signals. The public gets public signals.
– On Sunday, expert gets a signal.
– On Monday, public gets a signal.
– On Tuesday, expert gets another signal.
1 We use the notation px for the density of distribution p at x.
2 The incentive compatibility is also restricted to risk-neutral agents. Offerman et al. (2009) demonstrate how proper
scoring rules may be corrected for other risk attitudes.
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– On Wednesday, outcome x is revealed.
Question: Should expert reveal his information truthfully on Sunday?
Answer: No. Whoever sees two different truthful signals is able to calculate the outcome x =
(x+ ǫ)/2 + (x− ǫ)/2 exactly. For any distribution of ǫ, and for the logarithmic and almost3 every
other scoring rule, the expert should not tell the truth on Sunday. This prevents the 50% probability
that the market will know x on Monday, preserving a 75% probability that the expert can announce
x on Tuesday.
The canonical case, to which this example belongs, is “Alice-Bob-Alice”, where Alice speaks be-
fore and after Bob’s single speaking opportunity, both are awarded by a proper scoring rule for each
prediction, and both maximize their total score. Chen et al. (2010) as well as Chen and Waggoner
(2016) studied situations where several agents, each having private information, are given more
than one opportunity to make a public prediction. The situations are reducible to the Alice-Bob-
Alice game. The proper scoring rule assures that each will tell the truth on their last prediction,
and the open question is whether Alice, when going first, will tell the truth, lie, or keep her silence.
Chen et al. (2010) make the key observation that truthfulness is optimal if, in a different setup,
namely, a single-prediction Alice-Bob game where Alice chooses whether to go first or second, she
will always prefer going first. Building on that insight, Chen and Waggoner (2016) show that when
the players’ information is what they define as “perfect informational substitutes”, they will predict
truthfully and as early as allowed, when they are “perfect informational complements”, they will
predict truthfully and as late as allowed, while when players are neither substitutes nor comple-
ments, untruthfulness can and will occur. While this characterization is helpful, few concrete cases
have been settled. The most significant of those was to show that when signals are independent
conditional on the outcome, and the logarithmic scoring rule (LMSR) is used, the signals are infor-
mational substitutes, meaning that in such a case, Alice will reveal all her information truthfully
in her first round.
A strategy-proof mechanism of the Alice-Bob-Alice setting easily generalizes to a strategy-proof
mechanism for any number of experts and prediction order, because whenever an expert (call her
Alice) makes more than one prediction, one can roll together all experts making predictions between
Alice’s successive predictions into one expert (call him Bob), who shares their information4. This
is formally proved in Proposition 10.
1.2 Goals of the Mechanism
We seek a mechanism with several desirable traits.
1. Truthfulness: The mechanism should motivate all experts to make truthful predictions, that
is, to reveal their true subjective distributions of the outcome. At minimum, this means that
truth-telling should be a best-response to truth-telling by all other experts, according to the
player’s beliefs at the time of prediction, i.e., it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.5
An untruthful mechanism may still be locally truthful by which we mean that infinitesimal
variations from the truth are suboptimal, but telling a sufficiently big lie may be advantageous.
3 The example is true for the logarithmic scoring rule because its scores are unbounded. Every scoring rule that
values exact predictions over inexact ones sufficiently will do.
4 Chen et al. (2010) use the same construction to generalize from Alice-Bob-Alice to a finite-players game.
5 Note that the ideal of truth-telling as dominant strategy is not attainable here, because if a player is aware of
another player’s distortion, the correct Bayesian response is to compensate for the distortion.
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2. Full Disclosure: All information possessed by the experts should be disclosed. This means
that every expert makes a (truthful) prediction some time after getting his last signal. Otherwise,
the information on the outcome possessed in that last signal would never reach the public.
3. Promptness: Experts should reveal their signals by a truthful public prediction as soon as the
prediction schedule allows, and make an updated prediction whenever receiving a new signal,
again, at the earliest opportunity. Considerations by experts of when to make a prediction are
contrary to the interest of the public to have that prediction sooner rather than later. We shall
require a strong preference for promptness. Indifference to timing shall not count as prompt.
4. Bounded Loss: Hanson (2003) notes that in his market scoring rule mechanism, the market
maker effectively subsidizes traders to motivate their truthfulness, and he shows that market
maker’s expected loss due to that is bounded. We seek mechanisms that achieve this property.
1.3 Our Results
We propose three different incentive mechanisms, all of which are based on proper scoring rules,
all of which achieve truthfulness, and the third and last also achieves promptness. They are
1. Group prediction: All agents receive the final prediction’s (non-incremental) score. Since all
agents have a stake in the final prediction, all will reveal their information truthfully. On the
negative side, they are not motivated to be prompt about it. Another problem is freeloaders,
since agents with no information can participate and gain without contributing anything.
2. Enforce single prediction: Score each of agent’s prediction with an incremental scoring rule,
and award each agent the minimum score. Agents are therefore motivated to predict once only,
since having made a prediction, a further prediction can only lower their reward expectation.
With a proper scoring rule, this assures incentive compatibility with truthfulness. Agents are
not motivated to be prompt, but instead need to find the optimal timing to make their single
prediction. A major drawback is that when agents receive a time-varying signal, they will not
reveal all their information.
3. Discounting: Discount each of agent’s incremental prediction scores by a monotonically in-
creasing factor of the time. The idea is that if signals are not informational substitutes, they will
become ones if a sufficiently steep negative time gradient is applied. When successful, this mech-
anism achieves the ideal result of motivating all agents to reveal their information truthfully
and promptly, including when they receive time-varying signals.
We show that, under some light conditions, discounting will always work unless signals are
perfectly correlated, i.e., have a deterministic relation given the outcome (as in Example 1).
Table 1 summarizes how the incumbent mechanism, and our three proposed mechanisms, mea-
sure up against each of the traits we described as desirable in the previous section.
We thoroughly investigate the Alice-Bob-Alice game (and, by extension, multi-player, multi-
signal games) with both the logarithmic and the quadratic (Brier) scoring rule, when player signals
have a multivariate normal distribution or a multivariate lognormal distribution.
These distributions are among the best-known continuous distributions and naturally arise in
many situations. They are characterized, inter alia, by the correlation coefficient (ρ ∈ [−1, 1])
between Alice’s and Bob’s signals. When the logarithmic scoring rule is used, we find that when
these signals are too well-correlated (whether positively or negatively), prompt truthfulness is not
optimal. On the other hand, if the correlation is low, the game will be truthful and prompt.
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This includes the case ρ = 0, where, as is well-known, the signals are conditionally independent,
confirming the Chen et al. (2010) result for conditionally independent signals.
However, when the quadratic scoring rule, one of the oldest and most commonly used scoring
rules, is used with these multivariate distributions, it is never truthful for repeated predictions.
In all settings with either the logarithmic or the quadratic scoring rules, we show that our
discounting mechanism restores prompt truthfulness, with the single exception of perfect correlation
(|ρ| = 1) of the players’ signals.
We make the observation that information aggregation works differently in the presence of a
common-knowledge prior than where the prior is unknown. (The fact that agents have a common
prior does not necessarily mean that they know what it is). Whenever there exists a public prediction
forum, as for earnings estimates described above, or a market, the initial running consensus or the
initial market price serves as a common-knowledge prior. On the other hand, if players do not know
what their common prior is, even if they have one, their behavior is as if they have no common
prior.
We show that the discounting mechanism can be effectively implemented with an automated
market maker, as in Hanson’s markets, thus showing that it may be practically applied in prediction
markets.
1.4 Related Literature
Scoring rules have a very long history, going back to De Finetti (1937), Brier (1950) and Good
(1952). Proper scoring rules are often used for incentive-compatible belief elicitation of risk-neutral
agents (e.g. Armantier and Treich (2013)). Market scoring rules for prediction markets were intro-
duced by Hanson (2003).
The role of Chen et al. (2010) (which is based on earlier papers Chen et al. (2007) and Dimitrov and Sami
(2008)) and Chen and Waggoner (2016) in investigating the strategy-proofness of prediction mar-
kets was already described. Gao et al. (2013) and Kong and Schoenebeck (2018) resolve some more
scenarios. Conitzer (2009) embarks on a program similar to ours, citing mechanism design as a
guiding principle. Accordingly, he strives to achieve the Revelation Principle, where all experts
announce their private information to some organizing entity that makes the appropriate Bayesian
aggregation. As we discuss in Section 2.2 below, we do not share that vision: Experts often do not
know what part of their belief stems from truly private information, and even when they do, they
cannot afford to go on record with a prediction which is not their best judgement. His “Group-
Rewarding Information Mechanism” is similar to our Group Prediction mechanism, and its lack of
fairness is pointed out. Conitzer does not propose a mechanism that achieves prompt truthfulness.
Chen et al. (2010) also suggest discounting, that “reduces the opportunity for bluffing”, in their
words, but does not prevent it (Section 9.1), so their discounting mechanism does not achieve
our basic requirement of truthfulness. The reason is that their formulation is different from ours,
applying same discount to before and after scores. On the other hand, we discount every prediction
score according to the time its prediction was made. The difference is crucial, because theirs does
not result in a true market scoring rule, as defined by Hanson (2003). In consequence, our Section
2.4, on which our results rest, as well as our Section 5.2, do not apply to their formulation.
We shall occasionally rely on well-known facts of the normal and the multivariate normal dis-
tributions. The reader will find the basis for these in, e.g., Tong (2012).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formulate the problem. In Section
3 we investigate which predictions settings are already truthful and prompt. In Section 4 we offer
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strategy-proof mechanisms, and show how they can solve the gaps we have found. In Section 5 we
summarize and offer concluding remarks. Long proofs are to be found in the Appendix.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 Basics
Two players, Alice and Bob, make public predictions of a real parameter λ, whose prior distribution
is pi. The outcome x will be revealed after all predictions have been made. A prediction consists of
revealing one’s belief of the distribution of λ. Assume all agents take others’ predictions as truthful.
All agents (Alice, Bob, and the public) are Bayesian, and each prediction causes them to update
their beliefs, i.e. the posterior distribution, of λ.6
The posterior beliefs are distributions of the parameter λ which are inferred from priors and
likelihood functions using Bayesian techniques. In our discussion we find it more convenient and
succinct to represent beliefs, without loss of generality, by a real number, rather than by a proba-
bility distribution. We use the fact that, in Bayesian analysis, when the likelihood functions belong
to some family of distributions (e.g. exponential), all posterior beliefs belong to another family of
distributions (Gamma distribution for the exponential family) Q(Y ) ∈ ∆(λ), called the conjugate
prior of the first family. Y is a set of real parameters of the inferred distribution Q. We will assume
models where, one, and only one of these parameters is dependent on previous predictions, while
the rest Y \ {x} is known from the model, the timing and the identity of the believer, but does not
depend on any previous prediction. An example illustrates this:
Example 2. Assume Alice’s belief of λ to be normally distributed N(µA, 1/τA) where µA is the
mean and τA the accuracy (i.e. inverse of the variance), and Bob’s is N(µB , 1/τB) and independent
of Alice’s. τA and τB are set by the model and are commonly known. Assume an uninformative
prior. Using well-known aggregation rules for independent normal observations, if Alice announces
µA, Bob’s belief changes to the normally distributed N(µAB, 1/τAB), where
µAB =
τAµA + τBµB
τA + τB
τAB = τA + τB
Notice that τAB can be calculated without knowing any of the means µA, µB , while µAB can be
evaluated once µA and µB is known.
In this context we are therefore able to describe a prediction by a single real number (the
mean) rather than by a probability distribution. We shall say that Alice’s prior belief A1 is µA and
Bob’s prior belief B1 is µB. After Alice makes her prediction, Bob’s belief changes to µAB . After
Alice and Bob both make a prediction, the public’s belief is µAB . In context, these statements are
unambiguously equivalent to specifying the probability distributions in full.
The prior pi may be uninformative, assigning equal probabilities to all possibilities7, or, if not,
as also representable by a parameter. For example, if Alice and Bob participate in a prediction
market, the prior parameter is the market value before Alice’s first prediction.
6 This formulation is different from the mechanism of prediction markets, but equivalent to it. In prediction markets,
an agent replaces the current market prediction by his own. In our formulation, the agent merely announces a
prediction, which, assuming the agent is truthful, becomes the market prediction by Bayesian inference. This is
because all rational agents reach the same beliefs from the same data.
7 Technically, an uninformative prior may be envisioned as the limit of a uniform or normal distribution as the
variance goes to infinity.
6
Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T , with T the time the outcome is known. At, Bt, Ct ∈ R are,
respectively, Alice’s, Bob’s and the public’s (or market’s) beliefs at time t. At t = 1, A1, B1, C1
are their respective prior beliefs. Any prediction takes place at t > 1. t = 0 is “pre-prior” time,
when players beliefs are equal to their private signals, so that A0, B0 are respectively, Alice and
Bob’s private signals. At t = 1, each player is additionally aware of the public prior C1, so that
A1 is an inference from A0 and C1 while B1 is an inference from B0 and C1. If the public prior is
uninformative, then we have A0 = A1 and B0 = B1. In other words, the players’ priors equal their
private signals. For completeness, we define C0 = C1.
To avoid degenerate exceptions, we assume the players’ signals are informative. This means that
A1 6= C1 and B1 6= C1.
The signals have a common-knowledge joint distribution f(a, b;λ) conditional on the parameter
f(a, b; λ) := Pr(A1 = a, B1 = b|λ)
The order of predictions is Alice, Bob, then Alice again, and then the outcome x is revealed.
A twice-differentiable, w.r.t. λ, proper scoring rule S(p, λ) incrementally rewards each prediction
made, i.e., if a player’s prediction changed the public’s belief from p′ to p, the player’s reward for
this prediction, calculated when x is known, is S(p, x) − S(p′, x). Each player seeks to maximize
their total reward.
As the scoring rule is proper, Bob will tell the truth on his only prediction, and Alice will tell
the truth on her second and last prediction. The remaining question is whether Alice will tell the
truth on her first prediction. More accurately, the question is of equilibrium: If Bob is truthful, and
Bob and the public take Alice’s predictions as truthful, is truth-telling Alice’s best response?
2.2 Knowledge Model
As will be shown, the players behavior is affected by their common-knowledge prior, by which we
mean a belief distribution which is explicitly known to both players and from which each inferred
his or her current belief. That the common prior is commonly known is significant, because it is
quite possible, and even likely, that the players share a prior but do not know what it is. For
example, in predicting a poll, Alice and Bob may be basing themselves on knowledge of how their
acquaintances voted, but they may not know which acquaintances they have in common. Or, they
both may be basing themselves on a paper they read, but neither is aware that the other has read
it. If the players do not know what their common prior is, they cannot infer anything from having
one, and their behavior is as if they have an uninformative prior.
In prediction markets, and more generally in public prediction forums where all communication
is done in public, the common-knowledge prior is known. In the context of this paper, it is the
initial market value C1 (or, equivalently, distribution pi), when the Alice-Bob-Alice game starts.
2.3 Inferences from Predictions
Assume that inference functions are invertible, so that if a player’s prediction is known, her signal
can be computed. If Alice announces A1 = a, the posterior outcome distribution can be calculated
from her marginal distribution, fA(a;λ) := Pr(A1 = a|λ) =
∫∞
−∞ f(a, b
′;λ)db′. Mark it g(a).
g(a)λ = Pr(λ|A1 = a) =
piλfA(a; λ)∫∞
−∞ piλ′fA(a; λ
′)dλ′
(1)
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Similarly, if Alice announces A1 = a, and Bob privately observes B1 = b, Bob’s posterior
outcome is inferred from f(a, b;λ). It will become the public prediction when Bob announces it.
Mark it h(a, b).
h(a, b)λ = Pr(λ|A1 = a, B1 = b) =
piλf(a, b; λ)∫∞
−∞ piλ′f(a, b; λ
′)dλ′
(2)
2.4 Maximizing the Reward
How does Alice maximize her total reward for both her predictions? And is this maximum achieved
by telling the truth on both predictions? We will show that Alice maximizes her reward by mini-
mizing Bob’s reward, and therefore is truthful if truth minimizes Bob’s reward.
Proposition 1. Alice maximizes her expected total reward by making a first prediction that min-
imizes Bob’s expected reward, where expectations are taken according to Alice’s beliefs on her first
prediction.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 1. If a truthful first prediction minimizes Alice’s expectation of Bob’s reward, i.e., if
E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
E
λ∼h(a,b)
ΠB(λ; a, aˆ, b) =
{
E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b))
}
− S(g(aˆ), g(a))
is minimized at aˆ = a, then truth is Alice’s best policy.
A corollary that we will find useful is the following.
Corollary 2. Let c := aˆ− a be Alice’s deviation from truth, and define
∆(c; a, b) :=
[
S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b)) − S(h(a, b), h(a, b))
]
−
[
S(g(aˆ), g(a)) − S(g(a), g(a))
]
If, for every c 6= 0, and every b, ∆(c; a, b) > 0, Alice will be promptly truthful.
Alternatively, if, for every c 6= 0, and every b, ∆(c; a, b) < 0, Alice will not be promptly truthful.
Proof. If Alice assumes B1 = b when her belief is g(a), then Alice’s assumed belief is h(a, b), and
so her expectation of ΠB(x; a, aˆ, b) is (see (12) in Appendix), S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b)) − S(g(aˆ), g(a)). So
the corollary assumes that truth (aˆ = a) minimizes Alice’s expectation of Bob’s reward for every
b, and therefore also Alice’s total expectation of Bob’s reward. The corollary follows by Corollary
1. ⊓⊔
3 Which Prediction Settings are Already Truthful?
We described above (Example 1) an elementary setting that is not truthful, and a handful of
other settings have been settled either way in the literature. But in the landscape of prediction
settings that are of interest, the coverage has been very sparse. Beyond Chen and Waggoner (2016)’s
criterion of “Informational Substitutes”, which does not amount to an explicit algorithm8, we have
no procedure to settle any given case, and the problem remains opaque.
With the results we derived in Section 2.4, we now have such procedures. We shall apply them
to classify settings belonging to the most commonly-met continuous distributions and the most
commonly used scoring rules. The distributions are:
8 A submodularity property is required of the signal lattice, in a context described in their article.
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– The multivariate normal distribution N(µ,Σ). In contrast to general joint distributions, where
the interdependence of components may take practically any form, the interdependence of joint
multivariate normal components is completely determined by their covariance matrix. This
means that in the Alice-Bob-Alice game, the signals interdependence is completely determined
by a single real parameter: their correlation coefficient −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Our investigation boils
down to finding for what values of ρ Alice will be promptly truthful.
– The multivariate lognormal distribution Y = exp(X), where X is a multivariate normal dis-
tribution as described in the previous item. Stock prices, and their derivatives, are commonly
modelled by a lognormal distribution. Since taking logs transform multivariate lognormal ran-
dom variables to multivariate normal random variables, our classification of the multivariate
normal distribution readily provides a classification of this distribution too.
The scoring rules we cover are
– The Logarithmic Scoring Rule S(p, r) = log pr. As mentioned, this proper scoring rule is em-
ployed as Hanson’s LMSR market-maker. It has strong information theory roots, and is uniquely
local, i.e. depending only on the distribution at the outcome (r).
– The Brier/Quadratic Scoring Rule S(p, r) = 2pr − p · p − 1. It is the earliest scoring rule,
introduced by Brier (1950), in the context of weather forecasting.
3.1 Multivariate Normal Distribution
Let the public prior pi be distributed N(C0, 1/τC ), where τC = 1/σ
2
C is the accuracy. C0 is the
public’s prediction mean at the start of the game. Note that an uninformative prior is characterized
by having an arbitrarily large variance σ2C , or equivalently τC = 0, and in such a case, the value of
C0 is inconsequential.
Similarly, Alice’s and Bob’s priors are distributedN(A1, 1/τAC) and N(B1, 1/τBC ), respectively,
where τAC = 1/σ
2
AC and τBC = 1/σ
2
BC are the respective accuracies. A1, B1 are the means of,
respectively, Alice’s and Bob’s prior predictions. Alice’s prediction A1 is inferred from the public
prior C0 and Alice’s signal A0, and similarly for Bob.
We lose no generality in assuming that each of the player’s signals is conditionally independent
of the prior. Because, if Alice, e.g., is aware of the public prior C0 and her prior prediction A1, she
can consistently assume that her signal piA is distributed N(A0, 1/τA), where
A0 =
τACA1 − τCC0
τAC − τC
τA = τAC − τC (3)
It is easy to verify that piA and pi are mutually independent. Note that τAC > τC since we
assume Alice’s signal is informative, hence τA > 0.
For an uninformative prior τC = 0 this degenerates to A0 = A1, B0 = B1, as can be expected.
By assumption the private signals piA,piB and the public prior pi belong to a jointly multivariate
normal distribution, and as such, their joint distribution is completely determined by their means
and by their covariance matrix. Since piA,piB are, w.l.o.g., conditionally independent of pi, the
distributions are uncorrelated with pi, and the covariance matrix M for (piA,piB ,pi) is
M =

 σ2A ρσAσB 0ρσAσB σ2B 0
0 0 σ2C

 (4)
where ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is the correlation coefficient of piA and piB, defined as:
ρ =
Cov(piA,piB)√
V ar(piA)V ar(piB )
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As is well-known (e.g. Tong (2012)), components of a multivariate normal distribution are inde-
pendent iff they are uncorrelated, i.e. have ρ = 0.
Proposition 2. Assume that the model, including covariance matrix M (4), is common knowl-
edge. Then, knowing everyone’s prior prediction A1, B1 and C0, the posterior, marked piABC , has
distribution N(µABC , 1/τABC ), with
µABC =
(τA − ρ√τAτB)A0 + (τB − ρ√τAτB)B0 + (1 − ρ2)τCC0
τA − 2ρ√τAτB + τB + (1 − ρ2)τC
(5)
τABC =
τA − 2ρ√τAτB + τB
1− ρ2 + τC (6)
Proof. See Appendix.
With Logarithmic Scoring
Proposition 3. Let Alice’s, Bob’s and the public signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to
a jointly multivariate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (4). When using the
logarithmic scoring rule, the players optimal strategy is truthfulness and promptness iff
(
1− ρ2
)2(
1 +
τC
τB
)
≥
(
ρ2 +
τC
τA
)(√
τA
τB
− ρ
)2
(7)
Proof. See Appendix.
In particular, we note in Proposition 3 that the case |ρ| = 1 is untruthful, and more generally
the same is true when the correlation coefficient is either too positive or too negative. The middle
ground is truthful. In particular, substituting ρ = 0, where the players’ signals are conditionally
independent, is found to be truthful. This is a special case of the result of Chen et al. (2010)
(Theorem 5) for conditionally independent signals with the logarithmic scoring rule.
Also in particular, if the common prior is uninformative, or unknown, we get by substituting
τC = 0 in Proposition 3 and solving for ρ.
Corollary 3. Let Alice’s and Bob’s signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to a jointly multi-
variate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (4), and an uninformative or unknown
common prior (τC = 0). Then, with the logarithmic scoring rule, the players optimal strategy is
truthfulness and promptness iff

ρ ≤ σA
σB
and
1
4
(
σB
σA
−
√
σ2
B
σ2
A
+ 8
)
≤ ρ ≤ 1
4
(
σB
σA
+
√
σ2
B
σ2
A
+ 8
)
In particular, if σA = σB , truthfulness and promptness holds whenever ρ ≥ −
1
2 .
With Quadratic Scoring On the other hand, when using the Quadratic Scoring Rule, when
the signals belong to a multivariate normal distribution, truthfulness is never optimal. This is
summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let Alice’s, Bob’s and the public signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to a
jointly multivariate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (4). Then, when using
the quadratic scoring rule, truthfulness is never Alice’s optimal strategy. Alice is, however, locally
truthful for 0 < ρ < σAσB .
Proof. See Appendix.
Remarkably, the result is unaffected by the prior (σC).
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Table 1. Mechanism Score Card
Mechanism Truthful Full Disclosure Prompt Bounded Loss
Market Scoring Rule × X × X
Group Prediction X X × ×
Enforce Single Prediction X × × X
Discounting X X X X
4 Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
4.1 Group Prediction
Our first strategy-proof mechanism scores the last prediction made by a proper scoring rule, and
awards the score to each of the participating experts.
Proposition 5. Let x be the outcome, and let the last prediction made before the outcome is
revealed be distribution p. Then the mechanism that awards S(p, x) to each participating player,
where S is a proper scoring rule, is truthful. Furthermore, the mechanism elicits full disclosure.
Proof. See Appendix.
The mechanism does not motivate promptness, which we defined as a strong preference: Players
may predict as late as possible without harming their welfare.
Another drawback is unfairness: The mechanism awards all experts the same, regardless of
their contribution. Indeed, a so-called expert who has no information of his own may reap the same
reward as other experts by simply repeating the current public prediction. This means that, unless
the number of experts is bounded, the mechanism is not loss-bounded. Attempts to fix this would
be counterproductive, compromising truthfulness. For example, rewarding nothing to “predictions”
that merely repeat the public prediction, will motivate an uninformed expert to pretend knowledge
by “tweaking” the current public prediction.
4.2 Enforce Single Prediction
Since multiple predictions are the source of the potential for manipulation, a mechanism that
prevents that would restore general truthfulness.
Proposition 6. Let S be a proper scoring rule. The mechanism that scores each prediction with
the increment S(p, x) − S(p′, x), where p is the predicted distribution and p′ the previous public
prediction, and rewards each expert with the minimum score out of all her predictions, is truthful.
Proof. Once an expert has made a prediction, a further prediction may only lower her reward
expectation and so is not optimal. Since incremental, proper scoring rules are truthful with a single
prediction, the mechanism is truthful. ⊓⊔
While this mechanism is truthful, and loss-bounded, it does not motivate promptness. Every
expert needs to figure out the best time to make his single prediction, given other players’ strategies,
resulting in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. As Azar et al. (2016) show, this can be complex. Further-
more, full disclosure is not assured, since experts may choose to make a prediction before getting
their final signal.
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4.3 Discounting
The last, and, we will argue, the most successful mechanism we suggest for incentive compatibility
is discounting.
Discounting essentially uses a proper market scoring rule. As explained in the Introduction, for a
proper scoring rule S(p, r), the market scoring rule scores a prediction p S(p, r)−S(p′, r) where p′ is
the outcome distribution that was replaced by p, and r is the outcome. Now any scoring rule can be
scaled by an arbitrary constant k and remain proper. Furthermore, kS(p, r)−k′S(p′, r) where k, k′
may be different, is also proper. Generally, we can employ a time-varying scale factor k(t) ∈ R>0,
and use the proper scoring rule k(t)S(p, r), where t is the time (which may be the elapsed time from
some base, or an integer counter of events) of announcement of p. Discounting means choosing k(t)
that is weakly decreasing in t, whence we get a discounted scoring rule D(p, r, t) := k(t)S(p, r),
where t is the time of prediction p. When t′ < t is the time replaced prediction p′ was made, the
discounted market scoring rule for prediction p is
D(p, r, t)−D(p′, r, t′) = k(t)S(p, r)− k(t′)S(p′, r)
The idea of discounting is that, if without discounting Alice’s optimal strategy is to hide or
distort information on her first prediction, in order to reap a bigger benefit on her second prediction,
her calculus will change if a sufficiently steep discount, motivating earlier predictions, is imposed
on her reward.
We must be careful to use non-positive scoring rules with the discounting mechanism. Otherwise
a possibility exists that the discounted scoring rule will have negative expectation for a prediction,
creating a situation in which a player will prefer not predicting to making a truthful prediction. On
the other hand, for non-positive scoring rules, S(p, r) ≤ 0, so that, whenever 0 ≤ k(t) ≤ k(t′)
k(t)S(p, r)− k(t′)S(p′, r) ≥ k′(t)[S(p, r)− S(p′, r)]
So, if our original scoring rule had positive expectation, so does our discounted one.
Note that the logarithmic scoring rule log pr and quadratic scoring rule 2pr − p · p − 1, which
we have analyzed, are non-positive. Any scoring rule can be made non-positive by affine transform.
Remark 1. Non-positive scoring rules suffer from an artefact that is the mirror image of positive
ones: Experts have positive score expectation ([k(t)−k(t′)]S(p, r)) for merely repeating the current
prediction, and so will do so even if they have no information. In fact, the mechanism can offer
them this “reward” automatically, sparing them the need to make an empty prediction. While
this is ugly, its effect is minor, and the expected loss is still bounded by −k(t)S(p, r) at any time
t. As in other cases, attempts to mend this would be counterproductive. E.g., if we deduct the
“unearned” [k(t) − k(t′)]S(p, r) from every score, we will compromise truthfulness, as this reverts
to the discounting mechanism proposed in Chen et al. (2010).
Proposition 7. Using the notation of Section 2.3, if S is a non-positive scoring rule, and there
exists K such that
K ≥
E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
[
S(h(a, b), h(a, b) − S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b))]
S(g(a), g(a)) − S(g(aˆ), g(a)) (8)
for every A1 = a and every possible aˆ, then the game is promptly truthful with a discount factor
k(t) that satisfies k(t1)/k(t2) ≥ K, where t1 is the time of Alice’s first prediction and t2 is the time
of the second.
Proof. If (8) is satisfied, scoring rule k(t)S(p, r) satisfies Corollary 1. ⊓⊔
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From Proposition 7, we state sufficient conditions for discounting to succeed.
Corollary 4. If
1. S is a non-positive strictly proper scoring rule, and
2. E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
[
S(h(a, b), h(a, b) − S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b))
]
is bounded for every a, aˆ
– In particular, if S is the quadratic scoring rule, or any other bounded scoring rule, and
3. The right-hand side of (8) is bounded when aˆ→ ±∞, and
4. limaˆ→a
∂2
∂aˆ2
S(h(aˆ,b),h(a,b))
∂2
∂aˆ2
S(g(aˆ),g(a))
exists for every a, b.
Then there exists a discount factor effective at restoring truthfulness.
Proof. As S is strictly proper, and the nominator of (8) is bounded, (8) can be unbounded only at
infinity or at aˆ = a. At aˆ = a, (8) evaluates to 00 , so we invoke L’Hoˆpital’s rule to find the limit. By
the definition of a proper score rule, first derivatives again evaluate to 00 , so invoke L’Hoˆpital again
for second derivatives. ⊓⊔
Discounting can restore truthfulness in the untruthful settings we found in Section 3.
Proposition 8. Let Alice’s, Bob’s and the public signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to
a jointly multivariate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (4). When using the
discounted logarithmic scoring rule k(t) log pr, players are truthful and prompt iff signals are not
perfectly correlated (i.e. |ρ| < 1) and
k(t1)/k(t2) ≥ 1 + τC/τA
1− ρ2
/[
1 +
(1− ρ2)(τB + τC)(√
τA − ρ√τB
)2
]
(9)
where t1 is the time of Alice’s first prediction and t2 is the time of the second.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since Alice’s signal is informative, τA > 0, Proposition 8 shows that discounting will be effective
unless |ρ| = 1. The following, simplified discounting (omitting the denominator in (9)) will suffice
for truthfulness and promptness.
k(t1)/k(t2) =
1 + τC/τA
1− ρ2 (10)
Proposition 9. Let Alice’s, Bob’s and the public signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to a
jointly multivariate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (4). Then, iff signals are
not perfectly correlated (i.e. |ρ| < 1), there exists a discounted quadratic scoring rule k(t)[2pr − p ·
p− 1] for which players are truthful and prompt.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, we can formulate a proposition for the prompt truthfulness of a general prediction
forum.
Proposition 10. The public and a set of experts predict a parameter λ. Let there be a fixed schedule
in [0, T ] specifying when experts and public receive signals, and experts may make a prediction.
Agents may receive multiple signals, and experts may have multiple prediction opportunities.
Then the forum is generally truthful and prompt with a discount function k(t) ∈ R>0 that
makes all Alice-Bob-Alice subgames in the schedule truthful and prompt. These subgames are all
occurrences where any expert, identified as “Alice”, has two consecutive prediction opportunities,
and all experts who makes predictions in between are rolled into a single player identified as “Bob”.
Proof. See Appendix.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Conclusions
We showed that using proper scoring rules for rewarding predictions often leads to reticence or
deception. We formulated criteria for determining which prediction settings are truthful, and made
a complete classification of the class of prediction settings with normal and lognormal signals,
under the logarithmic and quadratic scoring rules. We suggested three new strategy-proof mecha-
nisms, and identified one of them, discounting, as having all desirable properties, and proved the
applicability and effectiveness of the discounting mechanism.
5.2 A Market Maker for the Discounting Mechanism
Hanson (2003) has shown that every market scoring rule can be implemented by an automated
market maker, who provides liquidity, and is willing to make any fair trade in shares of the form
“pay $1 if outcome is r”, for every r. This applies to our discounting mechanism for the logarithmic
scoring rule, which, as noted, takes the form of a market scoring rule for S(p, r) = k(t) log pr.
Applying Hanson’s explanations to our case, if at t there is an inventory s of shares sr for every
r, the instantaneous share price is
m(sr) = e
sr
k(t)
/ ∫ ∞
−∞
e
sx
k(t) dx
Assuming an infinitesimal trade path, this induces a cost function C(s, t). The cost of a trade
changing the inventory from s to s′ at t′, is
C(s′, t′)− C(s, t) := k(t′) log
∫ ∞
−∞
e
s′x
k(t′) dx− k(t) log
∫ ∞
−∞
e
sx
k(t) dx
Since k(t) is weakly decreasing in t, differentiating the above expression with respect to t′ shows
that the more any trade with the automated market maker is delayed, the higher its cost.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let A1 = a,B1 = b. Assume that Alice, on her first prediction, announces her prediction as
aˆ, where possibly aˆ 6= a. Alice’s belief at this time is g(a), while all other agents’ beliefs after Alice’s
announcement is g(aˆ). As discussed, Bob’s prediction and Alice’s second prediction are truthful.
Therefore, after Bob’s prediction the public belief is h(aˆ, b). After Alice’s second and last prediction,
which is truthful, the public belief is h(a, b) .
Alice’s total reward given outcome x, ΠA(x) is
ΠA(x; a, aˆ, b) =
{
S(g(aˆ), x)− S(pi, x)
}
+
{
S(h(a, b), x)− S(h(aˆ, b), x)
}
(11)
Bob’s total reward given outcome x, ΠB(x) is
ΠB(x; a, aˆ, b) = S(h(aˆ, b), x)− S(g(aˆ), x) (12)
The sum of Bob’s and Alice’s rewards is ΠA(x; a, aˆ, b) +ΠB(x; a, aˆ, b) = S(h(a, b), x)−S(pi, x),
which does not depend on aˆ. Therefore the aˆ that maximizes Alice’s reward is the one that mini-
mizes Bob’s reward. This is true for every x and b, and therefore it is also true for Alice’s reward
expectation at the time of her first prediction. This is before Alice learned that B1 = b, but had a
conditional distribution of it b ∼ B1|(A1 = a) based on her belief. In summary
argmax
aˆ
E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
E
λ∼h(a,b)
ΠA(λ; a, aˆ, b) = argmin
aˆ
E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
E
λ∼h(a,b)
ΠB(λ; a, aˆ, b)
⊓⊔
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We know the player signals A0, B0 from their prior predictions A1, B1 by (3).
First, let us calculate the posterior distribution piAB ∼ N(µAB , 1/τAB) from Alice’s signal
piA ∼ N(A0, 1/τA) and Bob’s, piB ∼ N(B0, 1/τB), alone.
Define an auxiliary signal pi′B = (1 − α)piA + αpiB where α :=
1
1−ρ
√
τA
τB
, whose mean is B′0 =
(1− α)A0 + αB0. Its variance is
σ′2B = (1− α)2V arpiA + 2α(1 − α)cov(piA,piB) + α2V arpiB
= (1− α)2σ2A + 2α(1 − α)ρσAσB + α2σ2B
and accuracy τ ′B = 1/σ
′2
B .
piA,pi
′
B are mutually independent, because
Cov(piA,pi
′
B) = (1− α)V arpiA + αCov(piA,piB) =
1− α
τA
+
αρ√
τAτB
=
− ρ√
τAτB
+ ρ√
τAτB
1− ρ
√
τA
τB
= 0
Then piAB is inferred from piA,pi
′
B by the standard inference rule for independent normal
observations.
τAB = τA + τ
′
B
µAB =
τAA0 + τ
′
BB
′
0
τAB
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Substituting for α and simplifying, we get
µAB =
(τA − ρ√τAτB)A0 + (τB − ρ√τAτB)B0
τA − 2ρ√τAτB + τB
(13)
τAB =
τA − 2ρ√τAτB + τB
1− ρ2 (14)
Now, as the public signal pi ∼ N(pi, 1/τC ) is independent of both piA and piB, it is independent
of piAB. Applying again the inference rule for independent normal observations, we have
τABC = τAB + τC (15)
µABC =
τABµAB + τCC0
τAB + τC
(16)
Substituting (13) and (14) in (16) and (15) we get (5) and (6). ⊓⊔
C Proof of Proposition 3
We first prove a lemma for divergences of the logarithmic scoring rule.
Lemma 1. Let s be the logarithmic scoring rule, and let p ∼ N(µ, 1/τ) and pˆ ∼ N(µˆ, 1/τ) be two
normal distributions with the same accuracy τ . Then
S(pˆ,p)− S(p,p) = − τ
2
(µˆ − µ)2 (17)
Proof.
S(pˆ,p) =
τ√
2pi
∞∫
−∞
e−
τ
2
(x−µ)2 log
{
(
τ√
2pi
e−
τ
2
(x−µ)2
}
dx
= log
τ√
2pi
− τ√
2pi
∞∫
−∞
e−
τ
2
(x−µ)2
{ τ
2
(x− µˆ)2
}
dx
= log
τ√
2pi
− τ
2
[ 1
τ
+ (µˆ − µ)2
]
= log
τ√
2pi
− 1
2
− τ
2
(µˆ − µ)2
where we used the fact that the second moment of N(µ, σ2) is σ2 + µ2.
Consequently (substitute p for pˆ above),
S(p,p) = log
τ√
2pi
− 1
2
and the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
The proof of the proposition follows.
Proof. We use Corollary 2. Suppose that A1 = a, and that Alice, when making her first prediction,
pretends that A1 = aˆ := a+ c
′, where c′ = τAτA+τC c. I.e., by (3), Alice pretends her signal is A0 + c.
By the Corollary, Alice is truthful if
∆(c; a, b) :=
[
S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b)) − S(h(a, b), h(a, b))
]
−
[
S(g(aˆ), g(a)) − S(g(a), g(a))
]
≥ 0
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for every aˆ and b. g(a), Alice’s distribution at her first prediction, is given by (3). When B1 =
b, the inferred distribution from Alice’s and Bob’s predictions h(a, b) is given by Proposition 2.
Substituting these, and using Lemma 1:
∆(c; a, b) =
τAC
2
(
c
τA
τA + τC
)2 − τABC
2
(
c
(τA − ρ√τAτB)
τA − 2ρ√τAτB + τB + (1− ρ2)τC
)2
= c2
{ τ2A
τA + τC
− (τA − ρ
√
τAτB)
2
(1 − ρ2)(τA − 2ρ√τAτB + τB + (1− ρ2)τC)
}
= c2τA
{ τA
τA + τC
− (
√
τA − ρ√τB)2
(1− ρ2)(√τA − ρ√τB)2 + (1 − ρ2)2(τB + τC))
}
(18)
(18) shows that c = 0, i.e., truthfulness, is either a global minimum or a global maximum of
∆(c; a, b) depending on the sign of the factor multiplying c2. Furthermore, this factor does not
depend on b (nor on a), and therefore Corollary 2 applies: Alice is promptly truthful iff
τA
τA + τC
− (
√
τA − ρ√τB)2
(1− ρ2)(√τA − ρ√τB)2 + (1 − ρ2)2(τB + τC))
≥ 0 (19)
Rearranging, we get
1− ρ2 + (1 − ρ2)2 τB + τC
(
√
τA − ρ√τB)2
≥ τA + τC
τA
⇒ (20)
(1 − ρ2)2(τB + τC) ≥ (ρ2 +
τC
τA
)(
√
τA − ρ√τB)2 ⇒ (21)(
1− ρ2
)2(
1 +
τC
τB
)
≥
(
ρ2 +
τC
τA
)(√
τA
τB
− ρ
)2
(22)
as claimed. ⊓⊔
D Proof of Proposition 4
We first prove a lemma for divergences of the quadratic scoring rule.
Lemma 2. Let s be the quadratic scoring rule, and let p ∼ N(µ, 1/τ) and pˆ ∼ N(µˆ, 1/τ) be two
normal distributions with the same accuracy τ . Then
S(pˆ,p)− S(p,p) = τ√
2pi
[e−
τ
4
(µ−µˆ)2 − 1] (23)
Proof.
pˆ · p = τ
2
2pi
∞∫
−∞
exp
[
− τ
2
{
(x− µ)2 + (x− µˆ)2
}]
dx
=
τ2
2pi
∞∫
−∞
exp
[
− τ
2
{
2
(
x− µ+ µˆ
2
)2
+
(µ − µˆ)2
2
}]
dx
=
τ
2
√
2pi
e−
τ
4
(µ−µˆ)2 2τ√
2pi
∞∫
−∞
exp
[
−2τ
2
(
x− µ+ µˆ
2
)2]
dx
=
τ
2
√
2pi
e−
τ
4
(µ−µˆ)2
For the quadratic scoring rule
S(pˆ,p)− S(p,p) = E
r∼p
[S(pˆ, r)− S(p, r)] = 2pˆ · p− pˆ · pˆ− p · p
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Therefore
S(pˆ,p)− S(p,p) = τ
2
√
2pi
[2e−
τ
4
(µ−µˆ)2 − 1− 1] = τ√
2pi
[e−
τ
4
(µ−µˆ)2 − 1]
⊓⊔
Local truthfulness depends only on the sign of the second derivative of Alice’s expectation of
ΠB(x; a, aˆ, b), as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let A1 = a. Assume that Alice, on her first prediction, announces her prediction as aˆ,
where possibly aˆ 6= a. Alice will be locally truthful if
∂2
∂aˆ2
[{
E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b))
}
−S(g(aˆ), g(a))
]∣∣∣
aˆ=a
> 0 (24)
Proof. As s is proper, for every b
∂
∂aˆ
S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b))
∣∣∣
aˆ=a
= 0
∂
∂aˆ
S(g(aˆ), g(a))
∣∣∣
aˆ=a
= 0
∂2
∂aˆ2
S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b))
∣∣∣
aˆ=a
< 0
∂2
∂aˆ2
S(g(aˆ), g(a))
∣∣∣
aˆ=a
< 0
Since h(a, b) is a conditional distribution on g(a), by the Law of Total Expectation we have
E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
E
λ∼h(a,b)
S(g(aˆ), λ) = E
λ∼g(a)
S(g(aˆ), λ) = S(g(aˆ), g(a))
From the above and (12) we have that
∂
∂aˆ
E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
E
λ∼h(a,b)
ΠB(λ; a, aˆ, b)
∣∣∣
aˆ=a
= 0
So aˆ = a is an extremum point for E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
E
λ∼h(a,b)
ΠB(λ; a, aˆ, b), and so is a local minimum
iff its second derivative is positive, or, equivalently, if (24) holds. ⊓⊔
The proof of the proposition follows.
Proof. We use Corollary 1. Suppose that A1 = a, and that Alice, when making her first prediction,
pretends that A1 = aˆ := a+ c
′, where c′ = τAτA+τC c. I.e., by (3), Alice pretends her signal is A0 + c.
By the Corollary, Alice is untruthful if
∆(c; a, b) :=
[
S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b)) − S(h(a, b), h(a, b))
]
−
[
S(g(aˆ), g(a)) − S(g(a), g(a))
]
< 0
for every a, b and c 6= 0. g(a), Alice’s distribution at her first prediction, is given by (3). When
B1 = b, the inferred distribution from Alice’s and Bob’s predictions h(a, b) is given by Proposition
2. Substituting these, and using Lemma 2:
∆(c; a, b) =
1√
2pi
{
τABC [e
− τABC
4
(
c
(τA−ρ
√
τAτB )
τA−2ρ
√
τAτB+τB+(1−ρ2)τC
)2
− 1]− τAC [e
− τAC
4
(
c
τA
τA+τC
)2
− 1]
}
(25)
Letting c→∞ we deduce
lim
c→∞∆(c; a, b) =
1√
2pi
(−τABC + τAC) < 0 (26)
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because τABC > τAC , since piABC ’s distribution is conditional on piAC , and Bob’s signal is infor-
mative. As this does not depend on a nor on b, the setting is not truthful.
While not (globally) truthful, Alice may still be locally truthful. By Lemma 3, we need to find
out when ∂
∂c2
∆(c; a, b)
∣∣∣
c=0
> 0. From (25), noting that ∂
∂x2
ye−zx2
∣∣∣
x=0
= −2yz.
∂
∂c2
∆(c; a, b)
∣∣∣
c=0
= −2τABC
τABC
4
( (τA − ρ√τAτB)
τA − 2ρ√τAτB + τB + (1− ρ2)τC
)2
+ 2τAC
τAC
4
( τA
τA + τC
)2
(27)
= −2τABC
τABC
4
( (τA − ρ√τAτB)
τABC(1 − ρ2)
)2
+ 2τAC
τAC
4
( τA
τAC
)2
(28)
=
1
2
τ2A
[
1−
( (1− ρ√ τB
τA
)
(1− ρ2)
)2]
(29)
As this is true for every b, we deduce that local truthfulness holds for 1− ρ2 > 1− ρ
√
τB
τA
. This
entails 0 < ρ < σAσB , as claimed. ⊓⊔
E Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We show that truthfulness by all players is a Nash equilibrium, by showing that for each
player, given truthfulness by every other player, if the player received her last signal, her best-
response behavior is to make a truthful prediction. For suppose a player has received her last
signal before the outcome is revealed. The player is aware of all her signals, as well as of previous
predictions by her colleagues who have spoken.
The player then hypothesizes the following: First, that she makes a truthful prediction now, and
second, she hypothesizes some sequence S of predictions by other players, subject to the condition
that all other players report truthfully their last signal (at least). The sequence ends in a last
prediction p(S). Under the hypothesis, p(S) is the player’s subjective posterior distribution of
the outcome from knowing all information in the (hypothetical) setting. Furthermore, it is the
distribution that will be scored by the mechanism. That is to say, the player’s score expectation
for the scenario is S(p,p). Now, if the player deviates, by predicting untruthfully, or by failing to
predict, the last prediction, still under the hypothesis, will be q. Now since S is proper, S(p,p) ≥
S(q,p) for any q, and therefore there is no gain in deviating.
As this is true for any hypothetic future sequence S, predicting truthfully at present is a best-
response regardless of the future. ⊓⊔
F Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Referring to the proof of Proposition 3, from (19), clearly a discount factor k(t) that satisfies
k(t1)
τA
τA + τC
− k(t2)
(
√
τA − ρ√τB)2
(1 − ρ2)(√τA − ρ√τB)2 + (1− ρ2)2(τB + τC))
≥ 0
will be effective. Rearranging this expression, the proposition follows. ⊓⊔
G Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. The logarithmic scoring rule is bounded. Referring to the proof of Propostion 4, from (25)
we see that
lim
aˆ→∞
E
b∼B1|(A1=a)
[
S(h(a, b), h(a, b)− S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b))]
S(g(a), g(a)) − S(g(aˆ), g(a)) =
τABC
τAC
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is bounded. Furthermore, from (27),
limaˆ→a
∂2
∂aˆ2
S(h(aˆ, b), h(a, b))
∂2
∂aˆ2
S(g(aˆ), g(a))
=
( (1 − ρ√ τB
τA
)
(1 − ρ2)
)2
which exists whenever |ρ| < 1. ⊓⊔
H Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. We prove the proposition by backward induction. Suppose that a discount factor k(t) has
been applied that would be sufficient to make all Alice-Bob-Alice interactions, with a “composite”
Bob as described in the proposition, promptly truthful.
Assume that general prompt truthfulness is not in equilibrium. Call “Alice” the last player who
is motivated to deviate from prompt truthfulness. This necessarily means that this is not Alice’s
last prediction, and that all players who make predictions between Alice’s current prediction and
her next one (call them Bobbies) are truthful.
Referring to Corollary 1 and its proof, it is readily seen that Alice maximizes her reward by
minimizing the aggregate score of all Bobbies. Now, with a market scoring rule, in an interval
where all players tell the truth, the aggregate score is the difference in score between final public
information (public’s distribution before Alice speaks again) and initial public information (public’s
distribution after Alice deviated). The sequence of events that led from initial information to final
information has no effect on the aggregate score.
Any one of those Bobbies (call him Bob) has the same initial information, and, since all Bobbies
speak the truth, the same final information. If we attribute all the signals of all Bobbies to Bob,
we would again have the same initial information and same final information. By Corollary 1, Alice
would tell the truth to minimize Bob’s expected aggregate score. She would therefore do the same
to minimize the Bobbies’ aggregate score, contradicting our assumption that she deviates. This
proves that no player deviates from prompt truthfulness. ⊓⊔
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